United States Citizenship by Master, Meher K.
MEHER K. MASTER*
United States Citizenship t
I. Dual Nationality, the Constitution, and World
Peace Through the Rule of Law
"Who is a citizen? What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I
have often been pained by the fruitless search for a clear and satisfactory
definition of the phrase 'citizen of the United States'. I find no such
definition.... Eighty years of practical enjoyment of citizenship under the
Constitution have not sufficed to teach us the meaning of the word or the
constitutional elements of the thing we prize so highly."'
Thus queried Edward Bates, Attorney General of the United States, in
1862. The enunciation of citizenship left much to be desired in the Con-
stitution as of 1789. Its nature, quality, durability and extend were
shrouded in the mists of uncertainty for almost a century until the enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Early Congres-
sional enactments were frequently amended so that it was not until 1940
that a comprehensive law of nationality came into effect. Today, the provi-
sions concerning nationality are enacted by the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act 1952, as amended. 2
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The purpose of this Article is to review the constitutional validity of the
provisions of Title 8 U.S.C. in the light of the famous judgment of the
Supreme Court in Beys Afroyim v. Rusk3 with special reference to the
constitutional validity of provisions concerning dual nationality and the
invalidity of provisions concerning loss of citizenship, and to suggest law
reform by way of amendments to Title 8.
The two modes recognised at law for acquisition of the status of citizen-
ship, are acquisition by operation of law without any voluntary act by an
individual, and acquisition of a status permitted to be acquired by a person
at law through some voluntary act such as nationalisation. In the acquisi-
tion of citizenship through the operation of law two principles-jus soli and
jus sanguinis-are utilised in Title 8 U.S.C. A person born in the territory
of the U.S.A., or a person born of a parent who is an United States citizen
is himself such a citizen by operation of law under Sec. 1401 of Title 8
U.S.C. This section creates seven different classes of citizens the quality of
whose citizenship varies according to the class; e.g., persons who are U.S.
citizens under Sec. 1401 (a) (7) stand in greater danger of losing their U.S.
citizenship than persons under Sec. 1401 (a) (I).
Because of the use of these two principles of acquisition of citizenship
under the laws of other countries, the operation of both these principles
simultaneously under the laws of two or more countries upon an individual
at birth results in the legal phenomenon of dual or multiple citizenship at
birth. For example, the son of an American mother and English father born
in India would, if all legal requirements were complied with, be an U.S.
citizen, British Subject Citizen of the U.K. and Colonies, and Citizen of
India.
Dual nationality may also result through the mode of acquiring citizen-
ship voluntarily under Secs. 1421-34 of Title 8 U.S.C., despite the oath-
provision in Sec. 1448. Such an oath abjuring allegiance to any foreign
prince or state of which the person is a: citizen, does not necessarily have
the effect at law of divesting an applicant of his existing citizenship since
1804, 2. Stat. 292, (e) 1813, Amended Act of 1802. 30th July 1813, 3. Stat. 52, (f) 1816,
Amended Act of 1802. 22nd March 1816, 3. Stat. 53, (g) 1824, Amended Act of 1802. 26
May 1824, 4 Stat. 69, (h) 1855, Act to secure the right of citizenship to children born of U.S.
citizens outside the limits thereof, 10th Feb. 1855, 10. Stat. 604, (i) 1868, Act of 27th July
1868, 15 Stat. 223, (j) 1906, Act of 29th June 1906, 34 Stat. 596, (k) 1907, Act of 2nd March
1907, 34 Stat. 1228, (I) 1910, Act of 25th June 1910, 36. Stat. 830, (m) 1917, Act of 5th Feb.
1917, 39 Stat. 874, (n) 1918, Act of 9th May 1918, 40. Stat. 542-548, (o) 1924, Act of 26th
May 1924, 43. Stat. 152, (p) 1926, Codification of Title 8 U.S.C., (q) The Nationality Act
1940, 54. Stat. 1137, 8 U.S.C., (r) The Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, 27th June
1952, 66 Stat. 166, 8. U.S.C.
3387 U.S. 253. (1967).
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termination of the existing citizenship depends upon the law of the country
of existing citizenship. For example, a woman who is a British sub-
ject-citizen of U.K. and Colonies by operation of law would not cease to be
such merely by taking the oath under Sec. 1448, since the British Nation-
ality Act 1948 provides a specific method of renunciation of U.K. Citizen-
ship.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, a distinction is drawn
between a national and a citizen of the U.S.A. Nationality is a broader
concept than citizenship being based on permanent allegiance, and a na-
tional of the U.S.A. includes both an United States citizen and a non-U.S.
citizen who owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
The concept of dual citizenship includes within it duality of nationality.
A person who is a British subject citizen of the U.K. and Colonies may, by
becoming a naturalised United States citizen hold dual nationality and dual
citizenship. A person who is a British subject, citizen of no country, may,
by becoming a naturalised U.S. citizen, hold dual nationality but not dual
citizenship, since he would only be a citizen of the United States.
The provisions of Title 8 concerning loss of U.S. citizenship appear to
be aimed at loss of both nationality and citizenship, since most of these
provisions appear to be concerned with situations in which a person has
apparently showed a lack of permanent allegiance to the United States.
Sec. 1481 of Title 8 provides three modes for loss of U.S. citizenship
depending on the class of citizenship and the particular circumstances. Sec.
1481(a), (6) and (7) provide for a declaration of formal renunciation of
citizenship by a person outside the U.S.A., (or within the country in war
time) but a citizen of the United States within the U.S. in peacetime, is
prevented by Sec. 1483 from voluntarily renouncing his citizenship, which
seems odd, since renunciation appears to be the only constitutionally valid
method left for loss of citizenship following the Supreme Court decision in
Afroyim v. Rusk.
Sec. 148 1(a), (8) and (9) provide for involuntary loss of U.S. citizenship
by a civil or military court decree. Secs. 148 1(a), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and
(10) provide for loss of U.S. citizenship by operation of law, and it is these
provisions whose constitutionality has been challenged. In all of these
situations, the mere performance of a prohibited act by a citizen operates
per se to terminate his citizenship without any investigation into the state
of his mind to determine whether, by performance of the proscribed act, he
actually intended voluntarily to relinquish or divest himself of his citizen-
ship. This is so because Sec. 148 1(b) raises an irrebuttable presumption of
fact that mere performance of the proscribed acts constitutes sufficient
evidence of intention, without giving the citizen, thus arbitrarily deprived
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of his citizenship, any opportunity to prove lack of "volens," i.e. the
requisite condition of mind to establish intent.
Further, the unconstitutionality of differentiating between classes of
citizenship under Secs. 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, and 1481, 1482, 1483 and
1451 has also been the subject of judicial criticism. The provisions of
Sections 1484, 1485, 1486 and 1487 indicate clearly the differences in the
quality of citizenship enjoyed by U.S. citizens in different classes.
Persons who are U.S. citizens by birth or descent under Sec.
1401(a)(1)-(7) may lose their citizenship only if they transgress the provi-
sions of Sections 1481, 1482 or 1483. Naturalised citizens of the U.S.A.
run a greater risk of losing their citizenship, since they may lose their status
under the provisions of Sections 1481-83, as well as by transgressing
sections 1484, 1487 & 1451.
As a result, the present position at law is that there are varying classes
of citizenship of varying quality. Persons who are U.S. citizens by birth
enjoy the most durable quality of citizenship. The quality changes, and the
nature of the citizenship becomes less durable, as it passes through the
various classes until it reaches persons with dual citizenship who possess
the least durable quality under the law as of 1968.
The provisions of these Sections not only result in a variable quality of
citizenship, but also have inherent in them the risk of rendering a citizen of
the U.S.A. stateless, as well as divesting a dual citizen of his U.S. citizen-
ship, leaving him solely the citizenship of another country. Under Sections
1481-89 a person who has no real intention of giving up his United States
citizenship may be rendered stateless or be bereft of his dual nationality.
It is submitted that the vast majority of these sections are uncon-
stitutional, and have been held to be unconstitutional in a series of judicial
pronouncements in cases of which Afroyim v. Rusk is the culmination. It is
further submitted that the only sections which have survived this judicial
attack are 1841(a)(6), 1488 and 1489 as regards the constitutionality of
provisions concerning loss of citizenship. These cases, which are discussed
below, support the following submissions:
1. That Congress has no power, constitutionally to enact legislation divest-
ing a person of his U.S. citizenship in a situation such would result in
statelessness of the individual concerned.
2. That Congress has no power to enact legislation divesting a person who
is a citizen of the United States of his citizenship against his will -without his
full and voluntary consent;
3. That it is constitutionally within the power of Congress to provide some
mode by which a person may voluntarily renounce his United States citizen-
ship, provided that such renunciation does not result in statelessness.
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II. Judicial Decisions Concerning Congressional
Enactments on Loss of Citizenship
The recent judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court in Beys
Afroyim v. Rusk, Secretary of State4 is an epic decision which settles
conclusively the view that Congress is powerless to enact legislation unilat-
erally depriving a citizen of the United States of his citizenship without his
voluntary assent or expression of intention to renounce such citizenship.
This view had found judicial approval as early as 1824 in Chief Justice
Marshall's judgment in Osborn v. The Bank of the United States. 5
Subsequently Congress had enacted several statutes which provided for
loss of citizenship arbitarily and unilaterally upon the performance of
certain acts by the citizen similar to the present provisions of 8 U.S.C.
1481-1489. Several decisions of the Supreme Court6 upheld the con-
stitutional validity which found expression most recently in the opinion of
the majority of the Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk which, it is sub-
mitted, now finally settles this point. The majority opinion in this decision
holds:
1. that Section 1481(a)(5) is void, the provision concerning loss of United
States citizenship by mere voting in an election in another country, being
unconstitutional.
and
2. that Congress has no power to enact legislation unilaterally depriving an
United States citizen of his citizenship.
The facts of this case are straightforward. The petitioner, Afroyim, was
Polish by birth and acquired citizenship of the United States by natural-
isation in 1926. In 1950 he went to Israel. In 1951 he voted in an Israeli
legislative election. Subsequently he applied for renewal of his United
States passport to the United States embassey in Israel. The State Depart-
ment refused to renew his passport on the sole ground that the petitioner
had lost his United States citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940, the provisions of which were the
same as those of the present 8 U.S.C. 148 l(a)(5). The petitioner challenged
this judgement.
The Supreme Court, in the majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Black, held:
1. Congress has no power under the Constitution to divest a citizen of the
United States of his citizenship, and no such power can be sustained as an
4387 U.S. 253 (1967).
522 U.S. 738, 827 (1824).6lnter alia, Perez v. Brownell 356 U.S. 44 (1957). See post.
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implied attribute of sovereignty, as was recognized by Congress before the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that "all persons born or
naturalised in the United States are citizens of the United States" completely
controls the status of citizenship, and prohibits the cancellation of petitioner's
citizenship in this case.
"The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in Perez, is
whether Congress can consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact
a law stripping an American of his citizenship without assent. This power
cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sover-
eignity possessed by all nations.... In our country the people are sover-
eign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by
taking away their citizenship. Our Constitution governs us and we must
never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers
specifically granted or those that are necessary or proper to carry out the
specifically granted ones. The Constitution, of course, grants Congress no
express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise
of the implied power to regulate Foreign affairs or in the exercise of any
specifically granted power. And even before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, views were expressed in Congress and by this Court that
under the Constitution the Government was granted no power, even under
its express power to pass a uniform rule of naturalization to determine
what conduct should and should not result in loss of citizenship .... 7Any
doubt as to whether prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress had the power to deprive a person against his will of citizenship
once obtained should have been removed by the unequivocal terms of the
Amendment itself. It provides its own constitutional rule in language calcu-
lated completely to control the status of citizenship .... There is no in-
dication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is
acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time. Rather
the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship
which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once acquired,
this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be stifled, canceled or
diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other
governmental unit ....
"To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because
he voted in a foreign election in violation of § 401(e) would be equivalent
to holding that Congress has the power to 'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the
effect of,' and 'take... away' citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amend-
7387 U.S. at pp. 256, 257.8387 U.S. at pp. 261-262.
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ment prevents Congress from doing any of these things, we agree with the
Chief Justice's dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without
power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under Section 401(e)."
"Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress
decides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants of
power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left
without the protection of citizenship in any country .... Citizenship in this
nation is part of a co-operative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the
country is its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it
completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of
citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and
does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible
destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our
holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he volun-
tarily relinquishes that citizenship.' 0
The opinion of the majority in Afroyim v. Rusk decides in clear and
unequivocal language that Congress has no power to deprive a citizen of
the United States of his citizenship without his expressed voluntary con-
sent. In so doing, it over-rules an earlier unfortunate decision of the
Supreme Court in Perez v. Brownell, which had upheld the constitutional
validity of this provision, and had become the source of much confusion, as
well as the subject of judicial criticism and doubt. The majority here
follows the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren in the Perez case,
whereas it is interesting to note that in a narrowly divided court, the
minority here follows the majority decision in the Perez case. The opinion
of the minority, briefly summarized, is as follows in this case:
I. Congress has an implied power derived from its power to regulate
foreign affairs, to enact legislation concerning loss of nationality.
2. The opinion of the majority of the Court in the Perez case proves that
this is within the power of Congress.
3. The opinion of the majority in this case is not substantiated by historical
evidence concerning the power of Congress to enact such legislation.
Historical evidence suggests that the draftsmen of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not consider "that citizenship was an absolute."
However, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion of Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion that "the evidence, to the contrary, irresistibly
suggests that the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend,
9387 U.S. at p. 267.
10387 U.S. at p. 267-68.
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and could not have expected, that the Citizenship Clause would deprive
Congress of authority which it had ... only recently ... exercised .... The
Citizenship Clause thus neither denies nor provides to Congress any power'
of expatriation.... The construction now placed on the Citizenship Clause
rests in the last analysis simply upon the Court's ipse dixit, evincing little
more, it is quite apparent, than the present majority's own distaste for the
expatriation power."'"
The issue raised here is essentially simple. Either Congress has the
power to enact such legislation to deprive a citizen of his citizenship
unilaterally expressly conferred upon it, in much the same manner as it has
the power to enact bankruptcy legislation in Article I Section 8 of the
constitution, or it does not. Mr. Justice Black believes that it does not. Mr.
Justice Harlan, while conceding that there is no express conferment of
such power, believes that there is implied power which may be wrested out
of the "necessary and proper" powers under the foreign affairs clause.
It is respectfully submitted that the minority view is not the better view,
since the very same historical evidence referred to in the minority opinion,
indicates that the Constitutional grant of power to enact legislation under
an Uniform Rule of Naturalisation is exhausted by the exercise of the
power in enacting legislation concerning modes of acquisition of citizenship
by naturalization.' 2
Since there is no grant of power under Article 1 of the Constitution, and
since Mr. Justice Harlan13 concedes that the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment neither denies nor (and this is important) provides
to Congress any power of expatriation, its consequences for the present
being exhausted by its declaration of the classes of individuals to whom
citizenship initially attaches, it is submitted that it follows that the opinion
of the majority of the Supreme Court is correct. The majority opinion is
also the better view, for reasons other than those arising purely from
Constitutional considerations.' 4
The facts of Perez v. Brownell' 5 indicate that there were other factors
which required consideration apart from the question of voting, which may
have hindered the Court from arriving at the conclusion it did earlier in the
Afroyim case.
Perez was a citizen of the United States by birth. When Perez was ten
years old, his Mexican parents took him to Mexico where he lived until
11387 U.S. at pp. 292-293.
'
2See Part 1, Historical Outline, above.
13387 U.S. 253 at p. 292.
4See V and V I below.
15356 U.S. 44 (1957).
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1943. In 1928 he had been informed by his father that he was born in the
United States. At the outbreak of the Second World War, he failed to
register for the draft in the United States, although presumably he should
have known that it was his duty to do so. Between 1943 and 1947 he came
to the United States on temporary labour admission permits, stating that he
was a native-born citizen of Mexico. In 1947 he applied for admission into
Texas as a citizen of the United States. Before a special commission of
enquiry, he admitted he had remained outside the United States to avoid
military service, and to having voted in potitical elections in Mexico. He
was held to have lost his United States citizenship. In 1952, he re-entered
the United States claiming to be a native-born citizen of Mexico,
over-stayed his visa duration, surrendered to immigration authorities and
was ordered to be deported as an alien. He resisted this order, claiming the
right to remain by virtue of his American Citizenship. On these mixed
facts, among which the petitioner had hopped alternately between claiming
to be a citizen as it suited him under various circumstances, the Supreme
Court, in a narrowly divided decision, 16 held that the challenged legislation,
when viewed in its historical setting, was valid and constitutional.
Whilst conceding that there is in the Constitution no specific grant of
power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, it
held that there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the
lawmaking organ of the nation: "The inference is fairly to be drawn from
the congressional history of the Nationality Act of 1940. ... that in making
voting in foreign elections (among other behavior) an act of expatriation,
Congress was seeking to effectuate its power to regulate foreign affairs."' 17
However, even in this case, the majority sought to lay a limitation on the
breadth of Congressional power. It stated: "Broad as the power of the
National Government to regulate foreign affairs must necessarily be, it is
not without limitation. . . Since Congress may not act arbitrarily, a
rational nexus must exist between the content of a specific power in
Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that power into execution.
More simply stated, it means that the means -in this case, withdrawal of
citizenship- must be reasonably related to the end-here, regulation of
foreign affairs. The inquiry-and, in the case before us, the sole in-
quiry- into which this Court must enter is whether or not Congress may
have concluded not unreasonably that there is a relevant connection be-
tween this fundamental source of power and the ultimate legislative ac-
tion."' 8
16Three dissenting judges, headed by Chief Justice Warren.
17356 U.S. at p. 57.181d.
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In Perez v. Brownell, the majority opinion ultimately justified upholding
the Constitutional validity of the enactment in question on the ground of
reasonableness, and then declined to consider whether Section 401(j)
which is similar to the present 8 U.S.C. 148 l(a)(10), could also be justified
in being upheld as constiutionally valid on the basis of reasonableness! The
majority opinion, it is respectfully submitted, may fairly be criticised as
being irrational. Since the majority concedes that "there is in the Con-
stitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the
effective regulation of foreign affairs,"'19 its conclusion that "there can be
no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the
Nation" is difficult to justify. To wrest from this implied power of Congress
over foreign affairs, by implication a further implied power to enact legisla-
tion concerning. loss of citizenship which deprives a citizen of his citizen-
ship without his consent, is to stretch power by inference and. implication
too far. To conclude thus that Congress has the power to enact legislation
concerning loss of citizenship is really no more than ipse dixit, a charge
which may be levelled with greater justification to the majority opinion in
the Perez case than was done by Mr. Justice Harlan to the majority
opinion in the Afroyim case.
The majority opinion in Afroyim v. Rusk follows the dissenting opinion
of the minority of the Court in Perez v. Brownell, in which Chief Justice
Warren clearly denied the power of Congress to deprive a citizen of his
citizenship.
"This Government was born of its citizens, it maintains itself in a
continuing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power
to sever the relationship that gives rise to its existence. I cannot believe
that a government conceived in the spirit of ours was established with a
power to take from the people their most basic right.
"Citizenship is man's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to
have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there remains a stateless
person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. . . . This
government was not established with power to decree this fate .... -20
"... The government is without power to take citizenship away from a
native-born or lawfully naturalized American. The Fourteenth Amendment
recognizes that this priceless right is immune from the exercise of govern-
mental powers. If the Government determines that certain conduct by
United States citizens should be prohibited because of anticipated injurious
consequences to the conduct of foreign affair's or to some other legitimate
governmental interest, it may within the limits of the Constitution proscribe
19356 U.S. 44 at p. 58.
20356 U.S. at pp. 64-65.
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such activity and assess appropriate punishment. But every exercise of
governmental power must find its source in the Constitution. The power to
denationalize is not within the letter or the spirit of the powers with which
our Government was endowed. The citizen may elect to renounce his
citizenship, and under some circumstances he may be found to have aban-
doned his status by voluntarily performing acts that compromise his undi-
vided allegiance to his country. The mere act of voting in a foreign election,
however, without regard to the circumstances attending the participation, is
not sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship. . . .The
basic right of American citizenship has been too dearly won to be so lightly
lost." 21
The decision of the Supreme Court in Perez v. Brownell bristled with
difficulties and caused much confusion, becoming a target of critical attack
in subsequent cases. 22 It is fortunate that the somewhat vaporous basis
upon which the majority justified its decision in Perez v. Brownell, need no
longer be a source of anxiety after the decision in Afroyim v. Rusk which
overruled the Perez case. The dissenting judgment of Chief Justice Warren
in the Perez case is now acknowledged to have been the correct enuncia-
tion of the constitutional position concerning Congressional power to enact
legislation resulting in loss of citizenship.
The decision in Afroyim v. Rusk supports the three submissions made
earlier. In view of this decision, and others subsequent to the Perez case, it
is questionable whether any provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1481-1487 survive the
constitutionality test, except perhaps Section 1481 (a)(6).
Section 1481(a)(8) was declared unconstitutional in Trop v. Dulles23
with reference to a native-born citizen of the United States, who did not
voluntarily relinquish or abandon his citizenship, or become involved in
any way with a foreign state. In this case, the petitioner, a native-born
citizen of the United States, was held, in the lower courts, to have lost his
citizenship and become stateless by virtue of his conviction by a court
martial for a wartime desertion. The facts leading up to this conviction
were as follows: In 1944, the petitioner was serving as an officer in the
United States army in French Morocco. He had been confined to a stock-
ade in Casablanca for breach of discipline, and jumped stockade. Next day,
he and a companion were walking back to Casablanca when an army truck
passed them and stopped. Petitioner willingly boarded the truck and was
handed over to the military police at Rabat. Petitioner's "desertion" had
211d. at p. 78.22Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1957);
Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163
(1964).
23356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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lasted a few hours at most, and he had willingly returned to the United
States army, and intended to return to his base. Subsequently he was tried
by a courtmartial; convicted for desertion and was sentenced to a dishon-
ourable discharge. When the petitioner later applied for an United States
passport, he was held to have lost his citizenship under 8 U.S.C.
148 1(a)(8). Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of this section on the
ground that it violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, being
penal in nature and prescribing a "cruel and unusual" punishment.
The Supreme Court sustained the petitioner's claim and held:
I. that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National
Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those pow-
ers. The right may be relinquished voluntarily and abandoned by express
language or by clear language and conduct to the effect that a renunciation of
citizenship is intended. Under these principles the petitioner had not lost his
citizenship. Citizenship is not a license which expires upon misbehaviour. 24
2. that even if citizenship could be divested in the exercise of some
governmental power, 8. U.S.C. 1418(a)(8) violated the Eighth Amendment
because it is penal in nature and prescribes cruel and unusual punishment.
"The Constitutional question posed by Section 401(g) would appear to
be whether or not denationalization may be inflicted as a punishment even
assuming that citizenship may be divested pursuant to some governmental
power..." which the Court held it could not be).. ." [This Section] is a
penal law and we must face the question whether the Constitution permits
the Congress to take away citizenship as a punishment for crime. The
problem still remains whether denationalization is a cruel and usual punish-
ment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. We believe... that
use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amend-
ment. . . . It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national
and international political community. This punishment is offensive to
cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. . . . The Eighth
Amendment forbids Congress to punish by taking away citizenship."
Section 1481(a)(10) was declared unconstitutional in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez2 5 as being essentially penal in character and inflicting severe
punishment without due process of law and without the safeguards which
must attend a criminal prosecution under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The facts of the case were: The respondent was born in the United States,
and hence was a citizen of the United States by birth. By reason of his
parentage, he was also a Mexican citizen, thus having dual nationality.
2356 U.S. 86 at pp. 91- 9 3, 99-103.
25372 U.S. 144 (1962).
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Between 1942 and 1946 he left the United States, and went to Mexico
solely in order to avoid military service in the United States armed forces.
In 1946 he returned to the United States, and in 1947 was convicted by a
Federal District Court in California, for evasion of his military service
obligations. He served the imposed sentence, was thereafter released, and
resided in the United States peacefully until 1953, when he was suddenly
served with deportation proceedings on the basis that he had lost his
United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 148 1(a)(10).
Petitioner brought action for a declaratory judgment of his continued
status as a citizen of the United States, and for declaration of the uncon-
stitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a)(10).
The Supreme Court held the section to be unconstitutional: "That issue
is whether the statutes here which automatically without prior court or
administrative proceedings- impose forfeiture of citizenship . . . without
due process of law and without according them the rights guaranteed by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments including notice, confrontation, com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses, trial by jury and assistance 'of
counsel.... We hold [Section 1481(a)(10)] ... invalid because in [it] ...
Congress has plainly employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality as
a punishment-for the offence of leaving or remaining outside the country
to evade military service-without affording the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 26
It is submitted that since 8 U.S.C. 148 1(a)(8) and (10) have been held to
be unconstitutional, subsection (a)(9) is also unconstitutional for the same
reasons.
Section 1484 was declared unconstitutional in Schneider v. Rusk,27 as
being discriminatory in nature and therefore violative of due process under
the Fifth Amendment, since no restriction against length of foreign resi-
dence applies to native-born citizens, and also now it would appear be-
cause Congress lacks Constitutional powers to effect involuntary dis-
vesture of citizenship.
In this case, appellant, a German citizen by birth, came to this country
with her parents as a-child and acquired derivative United States citizen-
ship at the age of sixteen through her mother. After college graduation, she
continuously lived abroad, married a German national abroad and lived in
Germany for eight years except for two visits to the United States. In
1959, she applied for a fresh United States passport. The Department of
State denied her a passport on the basis of Section 1484, stating that she
261d., at pp. 164-166.
27377 U.S. 163 (1963).
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had lost her United States citizenship. Appellant brought an action for a
declaration of her status as a citizen of the United States.
The Supreme Court upheld her status as a citizen, declaring Section
1484 to be unconstitutional: "We start from the premise that the rights of
citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same
dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution
is that only the natural born citizen is eligible to be President . . . This
statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens
as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do
the native born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to make.
Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,
it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.' . . . A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely
without suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at natural-
ized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad in a way
that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living
abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of
lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of
nationality and allegiance." 28
Sections 148 1(a)(5)(8), (10) and 1484 have thus been held expressly to
be unconstitutional. The question remains, which of the remaining sections
may be considered unconstitutional in view of the majority opinion in
Afroyim vi Rusk. It is submitted that all of Sections 1481- 1487 with the
exception of Section 1481 (a)(6) are invalid.
Section 1483 clearly falls within the ambit of the Afroyim ruling, since it
prohibits the very method which Afroyim holds to be a constitutional mode
of divestiture of citizenship. It is submitted that Sections 148 1(b) and (c)
are unconstitutional and violative of the Fifth Amendment since they
violate the essence of the requirement of true voluntariness. The arbitrary
and artificial, irrebuttable presumption of fact created under Section
1481(a) is contrary to the very nature of the requirement of true voluntary
intent to renounce citizenship which is a pre-requisite to loss under the
Afroyim decision. The provisions of Section 1481(c) which change the
burden of proof, and the onus required to discharge the burden of proof,
are a concomitant of Section 148 1(b), and hence, it is submitted, are also
unconstitutional, except for the provisions of the first sentence of Section
1481 (c) which are reasonable.
Hitherto, in several cases, questions had been raised regarding the re-
quirement of voluntariness in various subsections of Section 1481 (a), but in
28377 U.S. at pp. 165 168-169.
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these cases the constitutional issue was either not raised or not reached,
and the cases were disposed of on other grounds. These cases indicate,
however, the efforts made by the courts to prevent the application of
Section 1481(a) in individual cases, so that even though they prevented it
from taking effect by the judicial device of a shift in the standard and
burden of proof required to be discharged notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 1481(b). The amendment of subsection 1481(b) contained in
Subsection 1481(c) may have been enacted as a result of such judicial
efforts to mitigate the harsh effects of Section 1481 (b).29
In Cafiero v. Kennedy,30 the court stated that the question of the
"constitutionality of the conclusive presumption of voluntariness in Section
1481(b) has not yet been judicially determined". This case was decided
before Afroyim v. Rusk. It is submitted that after this decision the con-
stitutionality of this subsection is gravely in doubt. In Cafiero's case, the
petitioner, an Italian immigrant crewman, was served with deportation
orders. He resisted on the ground that he was a citizen of the United States
by virtue of his father's having been a citizen of the United States at the
time of his birth. Immigration authorities contended that he had lost his
United States citizenship by "voluntarily" serving in the Italian armed
forces without prior permission of the Secretary of Defense as provided by
Section 148 1(a)(3). The court held that the government had discharged the
burden of proof regarding voluntary acquisition, and dismissed the suit
without reaching the question of constitutionality.
In other cases, however, the courts have used the judicial device of
creating a higher standard of proof, and placing a heavier burden on the
authorities to discharge the onus of proving the requisite voluntary intent.
In Nishikawa (Mitsugi) v. Dulles,31 the Supreme Court placed a heavy
burden of proof "upon the government to prove an act that shows ex-
patriation by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence," and held further
that this rule regarding burden of proof would govern all cases under 8
U.S.C. 1481. In this case, the petitioner was refused an United States
passport, and was given instead a certificate of loss of citizenship on the
ground that he had served in the Japanese army thereby violating Section
1481(a)(3). The petitioner brought action for a declaratory judgment that
he was a citizen of the United States.
Petitioner had dual citizenship by birth, being a native-born United
States citizen, and a citizen of Japan by descent through Japanese parents.
29Amended Sept. 3rd 1954. c. 1256 Section 2.68 Statutes at Large 1146 and Sept. 26,
1961; Public Laws 87-301. Section 19, 75 Stat. 656.
30262 Fed. Sup. 140. (D.N.J.- 1966).
31356 U.S. 129 (i957).
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In 1939, he went to Japan for studies, and in 1941 was conscripted into the
Japanese army whilst Japan was at war with the United States. After the
war, he applied for a United States passport, but his application was
refused. The Court held that government had not fulfilled the burden of
proof establishing that the petitioner "voluntarily" served in the Japanese
army. The majority opinion attempted to ameliorate the hardship of the
decision in Perez v. Brownell.
Chief Justice Warren, in the majority opinion, stated:3 2 "Whatever diver-
gence of view there may be as to what conduct may, consistent with the
Constitution, be said to result in loss of nationality ... it is settled that no
conduct results in expatriation unless the conduct is engaged in voluntarily.
... Because the consequences of denationalization are so drastic . . . [the
principle] calls for placing upon the Government the burden of persuading
the trier of fact by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the act
showing renunciation of citizenship was voluntarily performed .... When
the Government contends that the basic right of citizenship has been lost,
it assumes an onerous burden of proof. Regardless of what conduct is
alleged to result in expatriation, whenever the issue of voluntariness is put
in issue, the Government must in each case prove voluntary conduct by
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence."
In Stipa v. Dulles, 33 the defense of (economic) duress was again held to
be sufficient to destroy the charge of voluntary conduct. The petitioner, a
citizen of the United States in Italy, was charged with loss of United States
citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 148 l(a)(4) for taking a job as a policeman .with
the Italian auxiliary police forces. The petitioner raised the defense of
economic duress, stating that in post-war Italy, jobs were scarce and he
could not find any other employment, and that he took the job because he
needed it. The Court upheld this defense, stating that the essence of
expatriation is that "the expatriating act must be completely voluntary."
An interesting point concerning voluntary loss by dual nationals arose in
Jalbuena v. Dulles,34 in which a United States Court of Appeals held that
mere acquisition of a passport other than a United States passport did not
indicate a voluntary intention to renounce United States citizenship. Peti-
tioner had dual nationality, being an United States citizen by birth, and a
Philippino citizen by operation of law. The petitioner had transferred
residence to the Philippines, and did not realize he still retained United
States citizenship. He applied for a Philippine passport, taking the oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Constitution on the passport application form.
321d., at pp. 133-138.
33233 F.2d 551 (CA 3, 1956).
34254 F.2d 379, 381-382 (CA 3, 1958).
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The Court held that petitioner had not lost his United States citizenship
under either Section 1481(a)(2) or under Section 1482: Under an ex-
patriation statute as applied to dual citizenship cases, "conduct merely
declaratory of what one national aspect of dual citizenship necessarily
connotes, cannot reasonably be construed as an act of renunciation of the
other national aspect of the actor's dual status .... It follows that because
nothing done by ... [the petitioner] can fairly be viewed as a renunciation
of the United States citizenship he enjoyed simultaneously with Philippine
citizenship, [Section 148 l(a)(2)] ... cannot properly be read as applying to
his conduct."
In Fletes-Mora v. Rogers,35 the court held that the requirement of
voluntariness was not satisfied in the case of dual citizen merely by the
petitioner's having taken a job with the Mexican post office, under Section
1481 (a)(2) and (a)(4), even though such a post was normally open only to
Mexican nationals after the taking of an oath, since the oath was not the
kind contemplated in this section.
Petitioner was a native-born citizen of the United States who was also a
Mexican citizen by parentage. As a child he was taken to Mexico, where
he remained until 1957 when he re-entered the United States. Petitioner
was informed in 1946 by his father of his birth in the United States. In
1944, when he was 18 years old, he had accepted employment with the
Mexican post office, and he retained it until 1951. After entering the
United States in 1957, petitioner was threatened with deportation on the
ground that he had lost his United States citizenship under Section
1481(a)(2) by taking the oath. Petitioner brought action for declaration of
his citizenship status.
The district court held that the oath was not an oath of allegiance
contemplated in Section 1481(a)(2), and hence that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the requirement of voluntary intention was satisfied when
the petitioner was ignorant, at the time of acceptance of the Mexican
employment, that he was a citizen of the United States.
Next, it is submitted that since the Supreme Court has held Section
1484 to be unconstitutional in Schneider v. Rusk, Section 1482 is also
unconstitutional in that it unfairly discriminates against persons enjoying
dual nationality, and hence violates the due protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It is further submitted that it would be preferable if Congres-
sional legislation were to acknowledge that which the courts have for so
long recognized, viz: that dual citizenship is an integral part of the law of
nations, and that, under United States law, a dual national should not be
35160 F.Supp. 215 (DCSD Calif., 1958).
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held to have lost his United States citizenship by the mere performance of
some act indicative of an affiliation with the state of his other citizenship.
The courts have tended to protect the United States citizenship of dual
nationals. Thus, in Fletes-Mora v. Rogers3 6 the Court stated: "A person of
such dual nationality should not be held to have expatriated himself unless
it clearly appears that he has voluntarily done some act by which he
unequivocally renounced his allegiance to the United States."
With reference to minors, it is submitted that in view of the legal
presumption that minors are incapable of acting with the intent required for
the voluntary renunciation of citizenship, the provisions of Sections
1481-1487 are on the whole reasonable, since they purport to effectuate
loss only after the attainment of majority. However, in so far as they
attempt to divest United States citizenship without a true voluntary in-
tention on the part of the erstwhile minor, they are unconstitutional. The
provisions of Section 1487 are, in any case, largely redundant since Section
1484 has been held unconstitutional. If, as is submitted, Section 1482 is
also unconstitutional, Section 1487 is defunct.
It is submitted respectfully that a better provision than that presently
provided by Section 1487 for retention of citizenship of the United States
by minors, would be a provision for a formal declaration of intention to
continue to remain a citizen of the United States by the minor after
attaining the age of 21 years, and without being coupled with an obligation
to make a choice between two citizenships, nor a residence qualification.
There is some indication in Perkins v. Eg,3 7 an old, pre-World-War-I
case, that an election between two citizenships should be permitted, but the
validity of such a proposition is dubious after Afroyim v. Rusk. In the
Perkins case, the respondent had dual citizenship, having been born in the
United States of Swedish parents, and through her parents, having
re-acquired Swedish citizenship during her minority. She was taken to
Sweden during her minority, and resided there until her 21st birthday.
Shortly prior to coming of age, she inquired at the United Consul in
Sweden about returning to the United States, and was informed she should
apply for an United States passport after attaining majority. Within eight
months after attaining majority, she was issued an United States passport,
and she returned in 1929 to the United States where she remained there-
after. In 1935, she was notified that she was an alien, and was threatened
with deportation. In 1936, she applied for a fresh United States passport,
but was refused on the ground that she was an alien. Respondent brought
action inter alia for a declaration of citizenship.
361d., at p. 220.
37307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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The Supreme Court held that respondent was a citizen of the United
States by birth; that the municipal law of every country determines how
citizenship of that country may be acquired, and that it follows that persons
may have dual nationality . . . "The mere fact that the respondent may
have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish
law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel
the conclusion that she has lost her own [United States] citizenship ac-
quired under our law. As at birth she became an United States citizen, that
citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it
through operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her volun-
tary action in conformity with applicable legal principles .... It has long
been a recognized principle in this country that if a child here is taken
during minority to the country of his parents' origin, where his parents
resume their former allegiance, he does not thereby lose his citizenship in
the United States provided that on attaining majority he elects to retain
that citizenship and to return to the United States to assume its duties." 38
In Rueff v. Brownel139 the Court goes further, indicating that even such
a declaration as is provided under Section 1487 is not required, and that a
person who acquires dual citizenship derivatively retains his citizenship of
the United States, even in the absence of compliance with the provisions of
this section, as long as it can be shown that such a person did not really
voluntarily intend to renounce his citizenship of the United States by his
non-compliance with the provisions of this section, is insufficient to deprive
him of his citizenship, absent a true intention to renounce it.
The facts of the case were as follows: Petitioner's parents were both
citizens of the United States by birth who emigrated to Germany prior to
their marriage. They were married in Germany, and petitioner was born in
Germany. Petitioner was thus an United States citizen at birth. Sub-
sequently, petitioner's father died, and her mother acquired German citi-
zenship in 1918. Petitioner thereupon derivately acquired German citizen-
ship and thus had dual citizenship. In 1933, petitioner emigrated to Eng-
land on a German passport for which application was made by her mother
on her behalf, who erroneously informed her that she had ceased to be a
citizen of the United States upon acquisition of German citizenship
through her mother. This passport was subsequently renewed. In 1934,
petitioner made enquiries at the American consulate in London regarding
her citizenship status, and was again erroneously informed that she had
ceased to be a citizen of the United States derivatively upon her mother's
having acquired German citizenship. In 1939, petitioner applied to the
381d., at p. 329.
39116 F.Supp. 298 (D.N.J., 1953).
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United States Consulate for a tourist visa to visit the United States on her
German passport. The Consulate refused the visa, but issued her a tem-
porary visitor's visa to enable her to come to the United States to seek a
determination of her citizenship status. Petitioner arrived in the United
States in 1939, consulted an attorney, and filed a formal passport appli-
cation which was denied her on the ground that she had lost her United
States citizenship derivatively upon her mother's acquisition of German
citizenship.
A few months later, after the decision in Perkins v. Elg, supra, petitioner
again made a passport application to the United States Consulate in Lon-
don, and this was again refused on the ground that she had (1) failed to
elect United States citizenship, and (2) had failed to establish residence in
the United States within a reasonable time after reaching majority, (i.e., on
grounds similar to the present 8 U.S.C. 1487). Petitioner then filed a third
passport application in London in 1941, and this was again denied, this
time on the ground that she had expatriated herself.
Petitioner then married a Belgian citizen in England in 1941, and thereby
acquired derivative Belgian citizenship, but she neither took an oath of
allegiance to Belgium nor did she formally renounce her United States
citizenship. In 1945, petitioner came to the United States with her hus-
band, an official of the Belgian Economic Mission, on a Belgian passport
which expired in 1951, and remained in the United States thereafter. Her
husband returned to Belgium in 1948, and re-entered the United States in
1949 as a quota immigrant. Thereafter petitioner and her husband resided
continuously in the United States. In 1949, petitioner applied for a certifi-
cate of derivative United States citizenship which was refused, and depor-
tation orders were served on her. Petitioner thereupon brought action for a
declaration of her citizenship status.
The United States Court of Appeals held, on these facts, that the
petitioner was a United States citizen by birth and continued to remain one
notwithstanding her acquisition of a derivative foreign citizenship during
minority, unless she was deprived of her United States citizenship either
by operation of law or by voluntary action in conformation with applicable
legal principles.
The submission of the government, that petitioner had lost her United
States citizenship by her conduct, viz., "failure to elect 'between dual
citizenship' within a reasonable time after she attained her majority and her
prolonged residence in a foreign state, was tantamount to a renunciation of
her United States citizenship . . .is without merit .... The failure of the
plaintiff to elect United States citizenship and return to this country for
permanent residence within the statutory period did not result in her
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expatriation either voluntarily or by operation of law ... Since there was
no duty on the plaintiff to elect between dual citizenship and return to this
country within the statuatory period, her conduct [on these facts] will not
support a presumption that she voluntarily expatriated herself."140
The dicta of the Court in this case support the submission that it should
not be made obligatory upon a minor who enjoys dual citizenship to elect
between his two nationalities upon attainment of the age of majority.
Although this case was decided before enactment of the present 8 U.S.C.
1487, the dicta of the Court indicate that the provisions of this section
would not find favor with them, and now, after the decision in Afroyim v.
Rusk, it would be unconstitutional for Congress to attempt to enact such
discriminatory legislation which would force a dual citizen to make an
election between two countries of both of which he is lawfully a national.
In view of the above outline, it is submitted that the far-reaching effects
of the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk are
such that none of the present provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1481-1487, except
Section 1481 (a)(6) survive the test of constitutionality. The review of these
cases substantiates the three submissions made earlier. 41 It is submitted
that it would be both proper and useful to repeal these unconstitutional
sections and to re-enact laws concerning loss of citizenship in accordance
with the three submissions. A draft of such new legislation is respectfully
submitted below, in accordance with both the enunciation of the con-
stitutional position by the Supreme Court, and the principles of the law of
nations. 42 In addition, in a number of cases in which the issue of dual
nationality has arisen, the Courts have, on the whole, tended to uphold the
concept of dual nationality, especially in circumstances in which the result
of divesting a person of his United States citizenship would be to render
him stateless (which is contrary to the United Nations Convention on the
Status of Stateless Persons), or to leave him with only the citizenship of the
other country. A review of these cases shows that out of 21, in only five
did the courts hold that United States citizenship was lost, and of these
five 43 in only one 44 were the full terrors of statelessness unleashed. In the
401d., at p. 305.
41See above submissions on p. 326.
42344 BROOKLYN L. REV. (Fall 1967) 83; 81 HARV. L. REV. (November 1967) 126; 20
VAND. L. REV. (November 1967) 1351; 53 CORNELL L. REV. (January 1968) 325; 17 AM. U.
L. REV. (December 1967) 86; 62 AM. J. INT'L L. (January 1968) 189; 36 U. CIN. L. REV.
(Fall 1967) 690; 56 MICH. L. REV. (1958) 1142.
43Rosasco v. Brownell 163 F.Supp. 45 at p. 59 (EDNY- 1958), Valdez v. McGranery
114 F.Supp. 173 (S.D. Calif.- 1953), Dulles v. lavorone 221 F.2d 826 (CA D.C.- 1954),
Perez v. Brownell 356 U.S. 44 (1957), Marks v. Esperdy 315 F.2d 273 (CA 2- 1963).
"Marks v. Esperdy 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
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remaining sixteen cases,45 the courts recognized the status of dual nation-
ality while refusing to divest a person of his United States citizenship.
Il. Suggestions for Law Reform
In view of the above exposition of the constitutional validity of various
provisions of 8 U.S.C., it is obvious that the Supreme and other Courts
have declared a number of provisions unconstitutional, that others may be
considered unconstitutional on a parity of reasoning, and that the tendency
of the courts is to uphold dual nationality. Does it then make sense to
clutter up the statute books with so much deadwood? It is respectfully
submitted that the following amendments would achieve the desired result,
by replacing unconstitutional provisions with such as are constitutionally
valid, and by enshrining the concept of dual nationality in the statute book:
(1) Title 8, United States Code, Section 1448.
Oath of Renunciation and Allegiance
Repeal the words "renunciation and" in the title of Section 1448. In
Section 1448(a)(2), repeal the words "to renounce and abjure absolutely
and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignity of whom or which the petitioner was before a subject or
citizen."
(2) Repeal in toto, Sections 1451, 1481, 1482, 1484, 1485, 1486 and
1487 of Title 8 United States Code.
(3) Enact the following as new provisions governing the loss of citizen-
ship, in lieu of the repealed sections:
SECTION Y(I) RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP
(1) If any national of the United States of full age and capacity, who is
also a national of another country, makes a declaration in the prescribed
manner of renunciation, of the nationality and citizenship of the United
States, the Secretary of State shall cause the declaration to be registered;
and upon such registration that person shall cease to be a national of the
United States; provided that the Secretary of State may withhold registra-
4Kawakita v. U.S. 343 U.S. 717 (1953), at pp. 723-24, Perri v. Dulles 206 F.2d 586(CA 3- 1953), Augello v. Dulles 220 F.2d 344 (CA 2- 1955), Riccio v. Dulles 116 Fed. Supp.
680 (D. Col.- 1953), Scardino v. Acheson 113 Fed. Supp. 754 (D.N.J.-1953), Soccodato v.
Dulles 226 F.2d 243 (CA D.C.- 1955), Lehman v. Achison 206 F.2d 592 (CA 3- 1953),
Correia v. Dulles 133 Fed. Supp. 442. (D.R.I.- 1953), Yoshida v. Dulles 116 Fed. Supp. 618
(D. Hawaii- 1953), Mandoli v. Acheson 344 U.S. 133 (1952), Peduzzi v. Brownell 113 Fed.
Supp. 419 (D. Col.- 1953), Dulles v. Katamoto 256 F.2d 545 (CA 9-1958), Re Bartista 118
Fed. Supp. 271 (1960), Fukumoto v. Dulles 216 F.2d 553 (CA 9-1954). Moldoveaunu v.
Dulles 168 Fed. Supp. I (ED Mich.- 1958). Rogers v. Patokoski 271 F.2d 859 (CA 9- 1959).
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tion of any such declaration if it is made in time of war or during a period
of national emergency, by a person who is a national of a foreign country.
(2) For the purposes of this section, any woman who has been married
shall be deemed to be of full age.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a national of the United States who
is a minor may not renounce his nationality of the United States by act of
his parent or guardian.
SECTION Y(I 1) DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP
(1) A person who has become a national of the United States by
naturalization shall cease to be a national of the United States if he is
deprived of that nationality by an order of the Secretary of State made
under this Section.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Section, the Secretary of State may
by order deprive any such naturalized national of his nationality of the
United States, if he is satisfied that the Certificate of Naturalisation was
obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of any material fact.
(3) Nothing in this Section shall result in loss of nationality, or any right
or privilege of nationality, of the United States which would have been
derived or been available to a spouse or a minor child of the naturalised
person who is deprived of his nationality under this Section.
(4) Repeal all provisions of Title 8 U.S.C. which are inconsistent with
these new suggested provisions for loss of United States nationality.
It is submitted that these provisions would achieve the desired end for
the following reasons:
The phraseology of Section Y(l) is within the ambit of constitutionality
stated in the majority opinion in Afroyim v. Rusk. In light of this decision,
the provisions of this suggested section cannot be struck down as being
void and unconstitutional unless the Supreme Court in the future were to
hold that Congress has no power whatsoever to enact any legislation
concerning loss of citizenship.
This section achieves the twin goals of prevention of statelessness, and
recognition of dual nationality, simultaneously, as well as being con-
stitutional. Since the United States citizen who is entitled to renounce his
citizenship is only that citizen who is already a national of another state,
his voluntary renunciation of United States citizenship will not render him
stateless. This section thus minimizes the risks of statelessness, However,
care must be taken to ensure that there is no abuse of the provisions of this
section by governmental or other pressures being brought on a dual nation-
al to renounce his United States nationality. The exercise of the right to
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renounce provided by this section must be entirely free, voluntary and
without duress of any form.
The phraseology of Section Y(I 1) is also constitutional in the light of
Afroyim v. Rusk. Here, it is not Congress or the State that is taking away
the United States citizenship of a person, but the person himself through
his wrongful acts. In this situation, the Secretary of State is merely making
a formal statement that a person who had no right to become an United
States citizen is not one, despite the performance of naturalisation forma-
lities. A person cannot, it is submitted, claim to have that which is not
rightfully his. If a person, by his own wrongful acts, deprives himself of
becoming a citizen of the United States and is not entitled to become one,
he cannot maintain that Congress is constitutionally powerless to deprive
him of that which was not rightfully his to begin with.
Unlike the present 8 U.S.C. 1451, this suggested section Y(I 1)
safeguards the derivative rights of persons dependent upon the denatura-
lised citizen, even though their rights are derivatively based on the wrong-
ful acts of such citizen, since it is submitted, it would not be in accordance
with fairness to deprive such persons of a status already vested in them on
the ground of another person's wrongful acts. Great care must be taken
however, to ensure that an unduly wide discretion is not vested in adminis-
trative authorities to exercise the power of deprivation by the device of
stipulating a cumbersome and complicated naturalization procedure.
Safeguards would be necessary to ensure that the paper-work and proce-
dure required for naturalization is itself simplified, to prevent abuses of this
section.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
